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REEL 4 (TAPE)

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REEL

WACK ODD, BOSSI EVEN

CPYRGHT

SEVANKIN:

--powers that we don't know

DULLES:

Well, I don't think there's very much to add on---I was still Director of the agency when the decision was made to negotiate if possible, or to work on the exchange. I'm quite prepared to say that I had then approved it and approve it now and think it was a wise step. I never shared some of the public and maybe of the press criticism of Powers. While it was difficult to tell and---until after we---the agency had talked with him and had made their report how well he had done, I think on the whole, he handled himself properly. You must remember that he was an aviator. He was a great navigator. He had a very difficult assignment merely on the aviation navigation side and to expect of him---to make of him a great undercover agent was impossible. We didn't try. I say we---the agency didn't try it until when I was there with my approval. I worked on that. We did give Powers all the training that was necessary, what we call code and evasion---that is, if he came down near a frontier

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JULIAN: CONTINUING

when he could get over, we gave him all the possibilities--the training for the possibility of escape. He might have come down in the desert--for survival. He was given instructions as to what he could say and what he couldn't say, but there was no--if we had tried to make him a technically trained agent, he could hardly have been a great aviator, because one of these two professions, or a fine aviator--one of these two professions took all a man's time--all a man's concentration and thought and I'm not sure that point has been brought out fully enough.

SEVAKID:

You said you felt he had handled himself well. You do not feel then that he exceeded his instructions as to what he could talk about, or not talk about in Russia?

JULIAN:

I do not believe he did, but that is a judgment I think that probably should be reached by those who knew more than I. I have been--I have not been connected with the Agency except in a casual way since he returned--

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DULLES CONTINUED:

since Powers returned and I'm not familiar with all of the interrogations and the---I've read the report of course that was issued and I've read the Congressional Hearings in so far as were available.

SEVAREID:

There were people who said he should have taken his own life. Surely there's no way you oblige a man to sign a contract to commit suicide if he's in trouble, is there?

DULLES:

No---no---you couldn't---first place, it would be ineffective of course. In the second place, I think it would be immoral and we just didn't do it. We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into a situation where you think that death is better than what awaits you, use it." That is about the instructions. There were no---

SEVAREID:

Up to that point, can you say anything about the effectiveness of U-2 flights---whether they were worth it or not?

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DULLES:

Well, I would like on that, refer to the statement that the Secretary of Defense made in the hearings that was published at the time, in which he indicated that---I don't remember his exact words, but generally that most valuable information had been obtained with regard to missiles, aircraft, other military installations which were obtainable by no other means, is that some statement of record which he made at that time.

SEVAREID:

To go back to a previous question. Is there not a real possibility that satellites could not get this kind of information in spite of Russian secrecy?

DULLES:

That I'll have to leave to the Department of Defense to answer.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, in connection with this whole affair, U-2, why is it that in our system, in our government, we have to go through publicly [REDACTED] all this agony of explanations and denials and then we get ourselves

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SEVAREID CONTINUED:

SOMETIMES caught that way? The British had a frogman apparently investigating a Russian ship in a British harbor. The man disappeared. The British government just never said another word about it as far as I remember. Is it possible for this government to operate that way, much as it would injure the interests of a man in the news business?

DOLLE:

It is, in certain situations---it's not in other situations and I doubt whether, in the two situations to which you probably refer, one the U-2 and the other Cuba probably, to---one could have never rested on the answer "NO COMMENT".

SEVAREID:

You could not?

DOLLE:

I doubt whether we could have. It seems to me it would have raised a even more serious problem than the problem of disclosing intelligence operations, namely the problem of responsibility in government.

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SENATOR:

How do you mean?

DULLES:

Well, I mean this. Do we have a kind of a government that would let---say, me as then Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane, even seventy thousand feet high over Russia? Is that a responsible kind of government [BUZZER]? Or a mountain expedition, or have something to do with an expedition for the training of Cubans that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that kind of thing can only be done with the approval of the highest authority and the American people or the world began to think that we had a government here where that kind of thing could be done without approval by the highest authority. There might be a feeling of uneasiness that there are some people here who could do things that might lead to serious international complications with knowledge at the highest level. So could the President have---have declined knowledge of these situations, or say, "I won't say anything about them."

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SEVANKID:

Isn't that where---

DULLES:

That man was a slight instance. That kind of thing would have been handled in the same way in the United S

SEVANKID:

We could then have done---handled minor incidents in the same way?

DULLES:

And would---would continue to.

SEVANKID:

Well, does this bring up the question then of whether there ought to be a watchdog committee so-called in Congress to watch over C.I.A. and what it does?

DULLES:

I'm glad you brought that up. I'd like to talk a little about that Congressional relations. The press has been saying that the Central Intelligence Agency had no gave no information to the Congress. Now---here are the facts. We have had from---for many years [REDACTED] a Sub-Committee of the appropriations committee of the House and the

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DULLES CONTINUES:

Senate, that went over our entire budget, to whom we disclosed any information they wanted. Sometimes they say, "Oh, we don't want further information on this particular subject." That Commission is under the Chairmanship of Mr. Cannon, the Chairman of the House Committee, Carl ^{ye} Hayden in the Senate. Mr Cannon had with him two Republicans and two Democrats---a committee of five. Three on the majority side, two on the minority side. All men of very outstanding achievements. John ^{mahon} Taber was the ranking minority member. George ^{mahon} Mahela, Harry Sheppard.

SEVAREID:

But you would not necessarily---

DULLES:

Jerry Ford.

SEVAREID:

Would you inform these men in advance of any consequent operation?

DULLES:

Certainly.

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WILL: YES, ROSSI EVEN

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SEYARID:

You would feel obliged to?

WILLIS:

Have you forgotten,
/unbrunckhantadky Eric, have you forgotten that after the
U-2 incident, Clarence Cannon, got up and I'll send the
to you---Clarence Cannon got up in the House---May 15,
I think it was, or thereabouts when this thing broke
and he said, 'I know all about this. We appropriated
the money for this. Our Committee was told about this.'
Well, I don't want to quote all his words, but it was
great---it was quite a thrilling speech and when he got
through, he---the house rang with applause. Now, you
ought to look at that, and that's an answer and if we
told the House Committee about the U-2, which was the
most secret thing we had and the best kept secret for
five years of any other operation that I've ever known.
Obviously we told these committees of other things. We
told them everything they wanted to know. Now, in
addition to the appropriations sub-committees in the
House and in the Senate, we had---which dealt with our
budget, we had a sub-committee of the Armed Forces Com-

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DULLES CONTINUED:

which was all really under the Armed Forces Committee in the House and in the Senate and Carl Vinson was Chairman of it in the House and later Representative (Killday?) whose just become a judge. We gave this Committee at various intervals and as requested, but we tried to fix them at regular times. We gave them briefings of everything we were doing and we did the same thing to a Committee of the Senate---Armed Services Committee--I should have said---I think I misspoke my. Well, what more could you do? Now, we could have that watchdog committee, but they would get the same things that these committees gets.

SEVAREID:

At any time, have any of those Congressmen be informed of highly secret operations, broken secrecy?

DULLES:

Never six. Never.

SEVAREID:

The record is as good as the Joint Atomic Energy Commi

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DULLES:

I think it's even better---if possible, but it's certain it's been perfect. There's been---absolutely nothing has been disclosed. In fact, in the ten years that I worked with the Congress, I found their security of the highest level and I had excellent relations. I felt that I could go to them at any time and they would be extremely responsive and helpful and they were. Naturally, they looked into things. They had some criticism here and there, but I have---one thing I have no complaint of for the ten years I was---I was here, were my relations with the congress.

SEVAREID:

Would a sub-committee so informed, be bound to inform a full committee?

DULLES:

No.

SEVAREID:

So it is kept within a small group?

DULLES:

That's right.

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SEVANKID:

This is quite contrary to the popular notion that a congressman is very talkative people?

DULLES:

I know. Well, you couldn't do this if they were talkative. Now, I---I've always said that while I didn't really see the use of a special watchdog committee, if that was the way that Congress wanted to work it out, I as Director would naturally acquiesce and give them everything that was possible, but I think there's one interesting question that ought to be considered, even before you go into whether there should be a watchdog committee of this kind for the Central Intelligence Agency. How does that fit with our own constitutional system? Our constitutional system is on a bicameral basis---that you have kind of two cracks at everything. You don't just take one house's judgment, you have two houses and if we begin to have joint committees, I think we're going to begin to break down the bicameral system. Now, I grant you that it would be possibly useful to have bicameral groups to hear reports. I remember when my

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DULLES CONTINUED:

brother came back from any trip, he had to go up to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and make a full report. Well, obviously the reports couldn't be different, because he was reporting on the same subject and I know that of course, Chris Hartter and Dean Rusk and others have had the same problem. It would---would save the Executive Offices of our government a lot of time if their reports could be made maybe to a joint committee, but I think then, when it came to debating that report, you ought to go back to the bicameral system.

SEVAREKID:

Mr. Dulles, are you satisfied that our intelligence operation in this country is as good as that of any free country?

DULLES:

I never like to make comparisons Eric. I think they're always invidious and it might seem like boasting, but I don't think there's any better intelligence in the free world than our own. I think over the last ten

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DULLES CONTINUED:

years and more---almost---well, it's almost fifteen now since the Central Intelligence Agency was organized. We've made very great strides. We have profited from the fact that we had a nucleus of highly trained men who came through the O.S.S., which, as you know, Bill Donovan organized and I would like to pay a tribute to Bill and what--what Bill did in the organization and functioning of the O.S.S. Obviously it had faults here and there, but it was a dynamic organization. It was a live organization. It did things. Many of the ablest men that we have in the organization were great. Dick (Helms?), who recently was given a high position is just one I might mention. Then also, we had quite a number of men who had a long period of training in the F.B.I., so even in 1947---we didn't start from scratch and we have had ten years and more---twelve---fifteen years almost now---since 1947, to build up and has been built up an organization of which, when I left, I could say I had great pride in it and I still do. Now, because we're a rich country, we have the

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DULLES CONTINUED:

facilities to make available more of the tools of intelligence of any other country in the world. One of the tools is money.

SEVAREID:

Another is---

DULLES:

Congress has been very understanding of our needs in this regard. I don't think I could say that any important thing we wanted to do we had to give up because of a lack of money. That is not the case with some of the intelligence services in the world. They have been short-changed as far as funds are concerned. We also have a great country to draw on. We're built up with people from all countries of the world and you can go and get someone who came from Poland, maybe naturalized, or maybe his father came from Poland, who speaks Polish. We have a reservoir of human material that exceeds that of any other country, including Russia.

SEVAREID:

But we don't have---

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MAC K ODD, ROSSI EVEN

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DULLES:

And we ought to have a good service.

SEVAREID:

We don't have to be innocents abroad?

DULLES:

Oh No, I think that idea really and the idea that because we're not four hundred years old in intelligence, the intelligence is not good. George Washington had a pretty good intelligence service as far as that's concerned and you go back in our history. We're not even new to intelligence from the days of the founding fathers.

SEVAREID:

Is there---in speaking of purely covert operation---I know most of the information comes in other ways, but the so-called secret agents we have. Is there something special in a man or a woman's temperament that's required for this kind of work?

DULLES:

Yes, you have to be able to keep your mouth shut. You have to have discretion. You have to have calmness under

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DULLES CONTINUED:

pressure. You have to have an insatiable interest in gaining information and maybe first of all, you've got to know what's important to get and what is important. We were flooded---we were flooded in the Central Intelligence Agency---I was there and I'm sure they still are, with the quantity of material, so an ability to know your target and know what bears on your target is one of the great---great qualities?

SEVAREID:

What about emotional temperament?

DULLES:

Well, you've got to have someone that's quite pragmatic, doesn't get too excited.

SEVAREID:

In the war, Mr. Dulles, I would occasionally run across an O.S.S. friend who had been working behind the German lines and I always felt that I would never have the courage to do that kind of work alone and they would usually say they just didn't want to back with the infantry, that that would really scare them. It takes

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SEWARD CONTINUED:

quite a different kind of temperament, doesn't it?

DULLES:

It does---it does. It's extraordinary of the number of people and even young people---I've always wondered. I wonder if you could tell me why it is young people seem to be more ready to risk their lives than the old codgers. I was going to say no old codgers, but we can't bring you into that class.

SEWARD:

No, I'm afraid you can't, but isn't it because they think it can't happen to them? We know better when we're older?

DULLES:

No, I don't know. It's something inherent in the blood: ---I mean the enthusiasm and you know, you can do more. I mean, you've got a physical machine that can do more and I---you want to use it. Could I/you just one thing on this subject, Eric, because I don't want to let the intelligence and go without saying so. Naturally, in a talk such as we're having and the writers for the pro.

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BULLES CONTINUED:

look on what's the glamorous side---I suppose the so-call
glamorous side, the spying and the espionage and so
forth, but that's only one area and in many ways, the
smaller area of the over-all work of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Most of our intelligence comes
in other ways than these ways we have been discussing.
It comes from reports of the State Department, or the
military attaches as---as well as the reports overtly
obtained in various ways by the Central Intelligence
Agency. Through the air---we pick a great deal out of
the air. I don't mean coded things, but I mean just
open messages. You'd be surprised. I guess you may
have seen the foreign broadcasting information service--

SEVAREID:

Yes.

DALLIES:

---that publishes something almost [BUZZER]---every day.
That's only a small bit of what they pick up of propagan
statements, speeches and so forth sent over the air all
around the world. Well that all then goes into a common

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DOLLES CONTINUED:

melting pot as it were in the Central Intelligence Agency where, through one of our departments called the Board of National Estimates, we prepare these position papers for the government. Now, these are prepared in co-ordinating with the State Department, with the Defense Department, where appropriate, the F.B.I., the Atomic Energy Commission and so forth and so on, as we meet in what we call the United States Intelligence Board. If necessary, we'll prepare these papers almost overnight. Sometimes it takes quite a long time. These papers will include an analysis of where the Soviet Union stands in the nuclear race, in the bomber race, in its economic growth and so forth and so on. It will include what's likely to happen in Algiers, what will be the developments in Finland and it will include also, an estimate on any subject within the range of our competence, that the State Department and the Defense Department, or rather of the action departments, or of course, the President, may want to have before he reaches a policy decision. Today, when you have over a hundred countries around the

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DULL'S CONTINUED:

world, any one of which might have developments that involve the security of the United States; who would have thought ten years ago that Laos would involve our security? One of the smallest, most obscure distant countries in the world. So, it's absolutely essential I think, to have an organization that can pool its material together, work with the other intelligence agencies and then present an estimate of where we stand in any critical situation in the world, so that when a policy is made, at least the facts will be before the ---the policy makers.

SEVAREID:

There's no way you can guarantee that the [BUZZER] policy makers understand these reports?

DALLS:

Well, all I can say is the practice is now grown up that they do read them and I have a pretty good idea that the that they understand them. Certainly men like the President and like the Secretary of State and the Secret of Defense---they don't have any trouble understanding---

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DULLES CONTINUED:

understand these reports and if you go through history, what would have happened if that kind of report had been on Roosevelt's desk the eve of Pearl Harbor? What would have happened if B..... H..... had had an intelligence knowledge of that kind---would England rise and fight if the neutrality of Belgium is violated? If Hitler, instead of listening not even to his generals, but only to his own intuition had had a report saying what will the British do if Poland is attacked? Now, I can't say it every time---the policy makers will say, "That's fine we know everything and so forth and so on---" but certainly to have this mechanism and get it read and get it considered is, I believe, an added security for the United States.

SEVAREID:

Of course, there were reports that the Chinese would intervene in Korea if we went to the Yalu, which were, either not seen or acted upon?

DULLES:

No, I'll tell you about that. That's one of the most

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DULLER CONTINUED:

of all the intelligence exercises. That happened before I arrived, so I can look at it from a perspective of not having a responsibility one way or the other. I've gone over that estimate several times. The estimate is a pretty good estimate and in effect, it said, "The Chinese Communists have forces deployed and ready to move if the political decision is made to do it." Now, the estimate didn't say as to what ^{the} political decision would be. That is, did not state, we all agree that the Chinese Communists will attack.

SEVAREID:

There were some State Department political officers who did estimate that they would make that political decision to come in, would they not?

DULLER:

Well, I don't know as to that. All I know is what the estimate made. It is one of the early estimates that was made by the reorganized Central Intelligence under "Beatie" Smith and a State Department Official would have been in on the preparation of this particular estimate.

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DULLES CONTINUED:

It wasn't as clear-cut as looking back today, but it was a pretty good estimate. Both President Truman and General MacArthur, however, referred to it in connection with the position that they took at that time. If you could look back at some of the articles that were written at that time.

SEVAREID:

Well, did General MacArthur in effect, make his own political judgment as to what the Chinese would do?

DULLES:

He had that estimate, I believe, at the time. That estimate was, as I understand it, was before him.

SEVAREID:

Do you feel that generally speaking, the problem of any blocks between the gathering of the information and getting it into the consciousness of top policy makers---that these blocks and lapses have been pretty well ironed out, do you?

DULLES:

Yes, one often says "You can lead a horse to water. Y

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DULLES CONTINUED:

can't make him drink." You can lay an estimate before a policy makers and you can't make him read it, but I think the situation has changed a great deal over the last ten years in that respect and now I think that the top policy makers are almost afraid not to read it and not to consider it and when an issue comes up and I've sat in more meetings of the National Security Council than almost anybody alive, over three hundred of them [LAUGHTER] over the last ten years. When these issues arise, I don't know of any serious issue where some estimate has not been prepared. Now, every once in a while, you have---you have to move very rapidly and it cannot always be formalized in a piece of paper. I mean you have to move very quickly. Sometimes it can be, even very quickly. I remember the time of the Suez incident, which occurred just at the time of the 1956 election, you may recall?

SEWARD:

Yes.

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REMARKS:

And I had left my office late in the afternoon to go up to vote the next morning and I vote on Long Island, where my residence---technical voting residence---not my tax residence, just my voting residence is, or my voting ability is. Everybody..... resident of the district in those days can vote where he last lived and I went up to Long Island and I arrived there and was having dinner with a group of friends that I had asked to meet with me and we just sat down, I remember and a drink was just being produced, when the telephone rang and it was General (Talbot) on the telephone from Washington. He said, "Bulganin has just sent a note to the effect that London and Paris will be attacked by bombs and missiles"...I don't know if he put them both in, but I think so---"bombs and missiles unless something is done in regard to the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt."

SEVAREID:

Was this a private note to us, or a public statement?

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DULLES CONTINUED:

It never was contemplated that it should, but those, I think, were the two most critical moments that I---I recall during those years.

SEVAREID:

Did you get any feeling of real worry over Berlin, for example, when the tanks of both sides were recently facing one another?

DULLES:

Yes, but I did not think that that was going to come to a shooting situation. I thought there might be a tragic incident or two, but I did not think that that would be allowed to get beyond---beyond that.

SEVAREID:

Mr. Dulles, one last question, speaking of Berlin. Did you anticipate this wall that went up last Summer? Because I've never found anyone who did.

DULLES:

We had anticipated that the tremendous buildup of the refugee flow, which was reaching staggering proportions for the---for the Soviet and the East Germans---to (th

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refugees out would cause the Soviet and the East Germans to take certain corrective action---which corrective action we estimated at that time, would probably be--- I say I estimated, I don't recall---I estimated, would probably lead to their taking measures to control all of the checkpoints of passage through which these refugees were then freely flowing, so as to cut this refugee flow down to---to more manageable proportions. I can't say that the---that we predicted they would build a wall, a Chinese wall. Maybe we should of, you know. I think they operate on the theory of walls of barriers. They've got walls and barriers all around the world. Generally barbed wire is enough, but it's interesting, isn't it? don't seem to me that we make enough of it. They have to cut their world off from the rest of the world. They have to cut their world, the Communist world, off. They can't allow either free entry, or free exit and if that isn't a---a condemnation of their system---they can't risk that. They have to wall their people in and they have to wall others out.

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